Arbitrary file read on the puppet master from authenticated
clients (high). It is possible to construct an HTTP get request
from an authenticated client with a valid certificate that will
return the contents of an arbitrary file on the Puppet master
that the master has read-access to.
Arbitrary file delete/D.O.S on Puppet Master from authenticated
clients (high). Given a Puppet master with the "Delete"
directive allowed in auth.conf for an authenticated host, an
attacker on that host can send a specially crafted Delete
request that can cause an arbitrary file deletion on the Puppet
master, potentially causing a denial of service attack. Note
that this vulnerability does *not* exist in Puppet as
configured by default.
The last_run_report.yaml is world readable (medium). The most
recent Puppet run report is stored on the Puppet master with
world-readable permissions. The report file contains the
context diffs of any changes to configuration on an agent,
which may contain sensitive information that an attacker can
then access. The last run report is overwritten with every
Puppet run.
Arbitrary file read on the Puppet master by an agent (medium).
This vulnerability is dependent upon vulnerability
"last_run_report.yml is world readable" above. By creating a
hard link of a Puppet-managed file to an arbitrary file that
the Puppet master can read, an attacker forces the contents to
be written to the puppet run summary. The context diff is
stored in last_run_report.yaml, which can then be accessed by
the attacker.
Insufficient input validation for agent hostnames (low). An
attacker could trick the administrator into signing an
attacker's certificate rather than the intended one by
constructing specially crafted certificate requests containing
specific ANSI control sequences. It is possible to use the
sequences to rewrite the order of text displayed to an
administrator such that display of an invalid certificate and
valid certificate are transposed. If the administrator signs
the attacker's certificate, the attacker can then
man-in-the-middle the agent.
Agents with certnames of IP addresses can be impersonated
(low). If an authenticated host with a certname of an IP
address changes IP addresses, and a second host assumes the
first host's former IP address, the second host will be treated
by the puppet master as the first one, giving the second host
access to the first host's catalog. Note: This will not be
fixed in Puppet versions prior to the forthcoming 3.x. Instead,
with this announcement IP-based authentication in Puppet < 3.x
is deprecated.